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ABSTRACT
We consider two duopolistic firms which both operate in two countries. The 
markets of the two countries are separate and each of the firms produces its good 
in one of these countries. We study the effect of an exchange rate change on the 
prices in each country and on the level of sales and of profits of each of the firms. 
When strong restrictions such as constant marginal costs are imposed, prices move 
in the “right” direction in response to an exchange rate change. However, with 
general cost and demand structures, even in this simple model, it is possible for 
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Exchange Rates and O ligopoly
Thorsten Hens,
University of Bonn 
Alan Kirman and Louis Phlips, 
European University Institute, Florence
1. Introduction
One of the more important questions in open macroeconomics has been that 
of the magnitude and direction of the changes in prices resulting from a change 
in exchange rates. We will examine this question at the level of a market for one 
good and will emphasise the role of industry structure and market separation. We 
will show that unless very restrictive assumptions are made even the direction of 
price changes may be perverse. It used to be argued that a devaluation reduces 
the foreign currency price of exports and increases the domestic price of imports. 
The overall impact of devaluation on the balance of trade was held to depend 
on the structure of cost functions. This analysis clearly recognised the idea that 
domestic firms might not be perfect competitors on the foreign, or international 
market. This approach was superseded by the monetary approach, which argued 
that the consequence of a devaluation would automatically be offset by an infla­
tionary process, which would restore prices in the domestic country to their former 
level in foreign currency terms (see Johnson (1972)). This argument justifies the 
Purchasing Power Parity theory of exchange rate determination and it is suggested 
that, in the long run, arbitrage would restore equilibrium. However, the precise 
mechanism through which this would be achieved is not spelled out.
The so-called “Scandinavian Analysis” (see Aukrust (1977)) tried to rectify 




























































































world market and suggesting that, after a devaluation, there would be pressure 
from workers to bid up wages to offset their loss in real income. The result would 
be that domestic prices would rise till the effect of the devaluation was just offset. 
Thus the basic argument is that domestic prices adjust so as to remove the differ­
ential induced by a change in the exchange rate, and not that the differential is 
consciously chosen. Indeed, at the end of the 1970s, Robinson et al. (1979) claimed 
that: “Under fixed exchange rates relative prices were stable, and changes in the 
exchange rate generated offsetting movements in the domestic currency prices of 
exports, so that the price in foreign currency terms did not change.”
Experience in the 1980s has done a lot to undermine this view. As Fisher 
(1989) points out, in that period the variance of the monthly changes of the Federal 
Reserve Board’s dollar index was more than 6%, whilst the dollar price of imports 
has been much less volatile. Even if this could be reconciled, in the short run, 
with the idea that markets are competitive, it would be difficult to explain why 
the appreciation of the dollar in the early ’80s did not lead to a proportionate 
decrease in import prices in the U.S. (see Mann (1986) and Feinberg (1986)). 
Indeed, the very fact that exchange rate changes are not fully passed through 
may, in part, explain the volatility of these exchange rates which are failing to 
achieve the adjustments discussed previously.
These observations have led international trade theory to examine the role 
of market structure, at least in the home market (the U.S.). In the seminal pa­
per by Dornbusch (1987), oligopoly and/or monopolistic competition in the home 
market is shown to imply an incomplete pass-through of a change in the exchange 
rate. Price discrimination by foreign firms is taken into consideration by Krugman 
(1987), Giovannini (1988), Feenstra (1989) and Knetter (1989). The response of 
primary commodity prices is discussed in Gilbert (1991).
The Dornbusch results are obtained using particular specifications of the de­
mand and cost functions for firms of equal size. The assumption of constant 




























































































on the home market price, ignoring prices and sales in the foreign market. This pa­
per tries to generalise the Dornbusch results in several directions. First, particular 
choices of the form of demand and cost functions are avoided. (It is well known, 
and indeed shown, that oligopolistic equilibria are sensitive to such specifications.) 
Second, the home and the foreign market equilibria are analysed simultaneously, 
with oligopoly in both markets. Third, price discrimination is allowed for, since 
oligopolists selling in two markets with different demands will find it profitable to 
price- discriminate as long as markets are separated. (We suppose that there are 
no tariff barriers nor transportation costs, but that market separation results from 
marketing devices (such as exclusive dealing) or legal and administrative barriers. 
Our approach is thus well suited for the analysis of trade between two member 
countries of the EEC.) Fourth, the production technology is nonlinear: economies 
and diseconomies of scale, as well as joint economies and diseconomies of scope 
(over the two markets) may be present. Finally, firm size can differ.
We adopt the comparative statics for oligopoly methodology developed by 
Dixit (1986). The analysis is therefore static, and inevitably suffers from the 
limitations inherent in comparative statics.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyses what a priori restrictions 
for comparative statics are imposed by the model. In section 4 we show that, 
with constant marginal costs, an appreciation of the foreign currency decreases 
the foreign price and increases the domestic price, and that the exchange rate 
changes are not fully passed through. We then introduce diseconomies of scope 
and show in section 5 that, with strategic complements, prices react as in section 
4. However, except for the special case of identical firms, when there are strategic 
substitutes it is possible that both prices move in the same direction. As section 
6 shows, with general cost functions we may even get the perverse result that an 
appreciation of the foreign currency leads to an increase in the foreign price and 





























































































We consider two markets, market 1 and market 2, separated by barriers other 
than tariffs and transportation costs. We examine the case in which there is a 
duopolistic structure, i.e. there is one firm located in market 1, selling i n  in 
market 1 and x 12 in market 2 and there is one firm located in market 2, selling £21 
in market 1 and x22 in market 2. The commodity is homogeneous. Generalising 
to the case in which there axe m firms in the first market and n firms in the second 
complicates the notation considerably, and does not change the results in the first 
part of the paper. In the second part, it will be seen that it is sufficient for the 
two firms to be different for us to be able to obtain perverse results. Thus adding 
more firms would simply reinforce this and the outcomes can only be restricted by 
making all firms symmetric. Limiting ourselves to the duopolistic case does not 
therefore restrict our results and greatly simplifies the presentation.
The profit function of the firm located in market 1, expressed in market 1 
currency, is
fli — •Pi('^i)x n +  e-P2(-T2)x12 — c1(x n ,x 12) (1)
where
2 2
X\ =  > , and X 2 =  ^ s , 2.
1=1 1=1
The inverse market demand functions are P\(X 1) and P2(X 2), respectively. 
The exchange rate e, is the value in market 1 currency of the currency used in 
market 2. (Thus were the “law of one price” to hold it would say that the prices of 
the commodity must be such that P\ =  eP2). The cost functions are Cj-ji,], x,2), 
with marginal costs c| and c\. Superscripts denote derivatives with respect to the 
first, respectively second, argument.
The firm located in market 2 has the profit function




























































































defined in market 1 currency. Thus our market is described by £  =  (Pi, P2, ci, C2) 
and e.
We shall make the following assumptions concerning the demand functions, 
the cost functions and the resultant profit functions.
A1 The inverse demand functions Pj(Xj), j  =  1,2 are continuous for all 
Xj  > 0. For each j  there exists Xj >  0 such that Pj(Xj) =  0 for all Xj > Xj and 
Pj(Xj) > 0 for Xj < Xj. Furthermore, Pj(0) =  Pj < 00 and for all Xj 3uch that 
0 <  Xj <  Xj, Pj(Xj) has a continuous second derivative Pj and Pj(Xj) <  0 for 
all Xj.
A 2 The cost function of the ith firm Ci(x;i,£i2) 13 defined and continuous 
for all output levels x ,i >  0 x,2 > 0. Cj(0,0) > 0, and c, has continuous first and 
second partial derivatives for all Xn,X{2 > O' Furthermore , c] >  0 and cf > 0 for 
all xn  >  0 and Xi2 >  0.
A 3 For all Xj\, 1,2 >  0, X i <  and X2 <  X2 • IIi(iji, x,2, X t, X 2) is 
concave.
We will be considering a Cournot Nash solution in which each firm takes the 
other firms’ strategies as given. With this in mind, let us look at the maximising 
behaviour of the firms.
Differentiating IIi and II2, the marginal profits are
n } ( a : i i , X i 2 , X\, X 2) =  P ^ - X ^ ) ! ! !  +  P\(Xj) — c }  ( i n ,  £ 12 )  ( 3 )
n j(x n ,x i2 , A i, X2) =  e(P2(X2)xi2 +  P2( X 2)) — c j(x 11,x 12) (4)
for firm 1, and
ri2(X21,X22, A i , -Y2 )  = P1(Xi)x2l +  P\(X\) — eC2(x2l,X22) ( 5 )





























































































Thus the system of equations
=  o i , j  =  1,2 ( 7 )
describes the first-order equilibrium conditions. 






negative definite, i =  1,2
which are assured by the concavity of IT, i =  1,2 (assumption A3). 
Equilibrium
We are, as we have said, interested here in a Cournot Nash equilibrium, i.e. a 
situation in which once the strategies of all players Eire specified, no individual has 
an incentive to modify his own. We have, in effect, already defined the reaction 
functions o f each firm i, i.e.
T; =  argmax n ;(r ;i)2 ;i2,A’i,A 2 ) * =  1,2
and an equilibrium is therefore a fixed point of the mapping
T : SR}.
It is easily proved that, given A l, A2 and A3, equilibrium exists (see Friedman 
(1977)). Indeed, if Pj < 0 ,  P} < 0  and ct > 0 for both countries and both 
firms, then A3 is satisfied and existence is ensured. However, if the second term 
is positive, i.e. if demand is convex and the cost function is concave (increasing 
returns to scale) A3 may still hold if the first term is large enough. Since we are 
interested in considering the case of increasing returns, this is important in what 
follows.
Our model does not yet have enough structure for us to be able to establish the 
consequences of an exchange rate change. We will thus make the assumption that 




























































































embodies the idea that a firm will increase its output if it obtains a positive 
marginal profit from so doing.
Thus we may write the profit adjustment process as
x =  /i(x, e) (7)
where
/ Z „ \ / n i\
X12 n?
X = and p =
121 ^2
\Z22 / \ u 2J
Linearising around the equilibrium point x*, i.e. taking a first order Taylor ex­
pansion, we obtain
( i n \ a 11 —c ' 2 611 0 / X l l  X jj \
X j2 —c 21 a22 0 eb12 X\2 — £ 12
X2l b21 0 a33 -ec^2 x2\ ~ x2\
\ X 22/ 0 eb22 —e c 21 044 . V 3̂ 22 X22 ^
where
btJ :=  p"{ :y ;)* î .  +  p ] { x ; )  i , j  =  1,2 (9)
which represents the change in the marginal profit of firm i in market j (in currency 
j)  when the other firm increases its sales in that market, and
ail =  *>11 +  -Pj(A7) -  c } ‘ ( x î „ x î 2) (10)
a22 =  e(642 +  P2(XZ)) -  Ci2(x J],x J2) (H )
a33 =  b2i +  -7i(A\) — ec2 (z2i,X 22) (12)
a44 =  e(b22 +  P2( X 2) -  C22(Xji,X22)). (13)
In short we write (8) as x =  A(,..)(x — x*). The coefficient matrix A clearly satisfies 
a necessary condition for stability, i.e. that the trace be negative, since this follows
from A3. But to justify using comparative statics we have to go 





























































































A4.1 All eigenvalues o /A (x.) have negative real parts.
Since A4.1 is not always a convenient assumption to work with, we will replace it 
sometimes with
A4.2 A is a negative Hadamard matrix, i.e. 
an <  0 and |a,;| >  la'il> * =  1,•• •, 4
which is a much stronger condition than stability.
3. Restrictions for Comparative Statics
We are interested in how the equilibrium given by the system of equations 
(7) reacts to exchange rate changes. At a first glance, one might guess that an 
appreciation of currency 2 decreases P2 and increases P\. We will call this the 
“normal” reaction. If both prices move in the same direction, we say the exchange 
rate change leads to a “surprising” reaction, and if P2 increases and Pi decreases 
we will call this a “perverse” reaction. To see what is going on in our model, we 
first analyse the way in which the various forces (effects) act. The interactions are 
illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1
An increase in e has two direct effects. That is to say, ceteris paribus, selling 
in market 2 becomes more attractive to firm 1, i.e. 112 increases and selling 




























































































direct effects induce cost and demand effects. Depending on whether ci exhibits 
economies of scope (c j2 < 0) or diseconomies of scope (c j2 > 0) the increase in X\2 
will increase (rsp. decrease) i n .  Analogous arguments apply to C2- An increase 
in X\2 decreases (increases) X22 if x22 is a strategic substitute (b22 <  0) rsp. a 
strategic complement (f>22 > 0) of X12. And these secondary effects induce further 
effects and so on.1 To see the overall impact on the system we have to solve the 
system of equations







. , 7i = ( - l /e ) c ? ( x J , ,x î2), 
with
7 2  =  C2( x 2i ,  X 22).
Without risk of confusion we will refer from now on to the elements of 
as a.ij. The next lemma clarifies which restrictions on the comparative statics 
equations (14) are implied by the assumptions made so far. Before we state the 
lemma, we remark that our assumptions A1 - A3 lead to the following restrictions 
for (14). (A4 is a direct assumption on A(*.) thus, we do not mention it in this 
context).
From the definition of the profit functions, we must have that
(i) CI14 — Ü23 — 032 — <241 — 0 and 2242 — 2221, a34 =  <243. 
Furthermore A2 restricts
(ii) 71 to be negative and j 2 to be positive.
Finally, A3 means that
212 2233, «34
are negative definite. 
But apart from these three conditions, A(r. ) may take any values, provided that




<221, 2222 _ . 2243, <244
the following regularity condition is satisfied.
1 A  full discussion o f  this type o f  problem is given by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer 




























































































(iv) <Z13 ^  a3X, 024 i= 042
Lem m a 1. Let e >  0 be any exchange rate and let (A, j )  be any set o f parameters 
for a 4 x4  linear system of equations that satisfies (i) - (iv) given above. Then there 
exists an International Market £ — (c ;,P j) i , j  =  1,2 satisfying assumptions A1 
- A3 such that ( A, -y) is generated by £ as the parameter values o f its comparative 
statics equation (If ) .
PROOF:
Since only the equilibrium values of A( ) and 7( j matter in (14), at the point 
i* , we can consider the values of the functions (c,, Pj) i , j  =  1,2 and their first 
and second derivatives as the parameters which we are free to choose. Together 
with x * itself, we then have 22 parameters to generate the 12 different values given 
by ( A, 7).
To satisfy A1 and A2 we only have to restrict our choice to values (x*- > 0, C;(x*j, 
x*2) > 0, ci ( x ii’ x 1*2 )  > 0, Pj (X f )  >  0 and Pj(Xj )  < 0) i , j  =  1,2 and extend 
(Ci,Pj) i , j  =  1,2 to points different from x * appropriately. Since An  and A 22 are 
negative definite, we can always extend (ci,Pj) i , j  =  1,2 in such a way that A3 
is satisfied.
To simplify notation, in the following, we use the function symbols to denote the 
values of the functions at x*, e.g. Pj denotes Pj(X*)  j  =  1,2.
To sum up then, the problem is to find (x*j > 0 ,  c, > 0, c\ >  0, Pj > 0, P} < 
0 and c” , r, s =  1,2, Pj ) i,j =  1,2 such that
(15.1) PiX*j +  P2i*2 — c, > 0 i =  1,2
(15.2) P [x 'n + P i  - c j  =  0
(15.3) e(P'2x ^  +  P2) - c ]  =  0
(15.4) P[x l j + P i -e c \  =  0
(15.5) P2x*2 +  P2 — c2 =  0
(15 .6 ) P " z 11 +  P[ =  bn
(15 .7 ) P " x *12 +  P'2 =  b12
(15 .8 ) P j'x 21 +  P'x =  621
(15 .9 ) P 2'x *22 +  P 2 =  i>22
(15 .10) bn + p 'i - c } 1 =  a u  < 0
(15 .11) e(6 12 +  P'i)1 — c p  =  a 22 <




























































































(15.13) e(&22 + P2 —  c22) =  °44 < 0
(15.14) c2 =  - e i !
(15.15) c\ =  72
(15.16) - c { 2 =  ai2 =  - c l 1
(15.17) —ecj2 = 034 = — eCj1
Now, choose =  c|2, c}2 =  c j1 and c2, cl to satisfy (15.14) - (15.17).
We see that given any (bjj, Pj) i , j  =  1,2 we can find (cP )  i , j  =  1,2 to satisfy 
(15.10) - (15.13). Furthermore there always exist c, >  0 such that (1) is still 
satisfied since (Pj > 0, x*tJ >  0) i , j  =  1,2.
Thus we are left with (15.2) - (15.9) and the parameters
(x 'j >  0, cj > 0, Pj >  0, Pj <  0, P j )  i , j  =  1,2
Given any (Pj <  0 and 1*. >  0 i ^  j )  i , j  =  1,2 we find (cj >  0, x*, > 
0 and P, > 0 )  j =  1,2 to satisfy (15.2) - (15.5):
Since (Pj < 0 and (x*; > 0 and c2 >  0) i ^  j )  i , j  =  1,2 we can always
find Pj > 0, j  =  1,2 to satisfy (15.3) and (15.4).
To fulfil (15.2) first choose x*j > 0 small enough to make PiX*u +  P\ positive and 
then choose c\ >  0 appropriately. Proceed analogously for (15.4).
Thus we are left with (Pj < 0 , P} , xj), i ^  j )  i , j  =  1,2 for (15.6) - (15.9). 
Solving (15.6) and (15.8) as a linear system in P , and P, we get P, =
I 11 Z 21
Thus, since 621 ^  611 it is always possible to choose X21 such that Pi >  0 solves





























































































4. Constant Marginal Costs (Independent Markets)
In this section we make the assumption that the marginal costs of both firms 
are constant. This considerably simplifies the analysis since the feedback from one 
market to another through costs is eliminated. Each firm can effectively solve its 
problem on each market separately. A change in the quantity sold on one market 
will not affect the marginal cost of the quantity sold on the other. With this 
assumption we get a definite answer to how prices react to exchange rate changes:
P roposition  1. Under A l - AJ.l in the case of constant marginal costs, an 
appreciation of the currency of market 2 decreases P2 and increases P\. Further­
more, firm 1 increases sales in market 2 and firm 2 decreases sales in market 1, 
but firms’ quantity changes in their home market depend on the strategic effect on 
marginal profits. If in the home market a firm’s product is a strategic substitute 
(complement) to its opponent’s products then its quantity changes in the oppo­
site (same) direction as its opponent’s quantity. The absolute value of the price 
elasticities is smaller than 1/8 (incomplete pass through) if demand functions are 
linear.
P r o o f :
If in the system of equations (14) we exchange the second equation with the 
third equation, we see that with constant marginal costs markets are independent, 
i.e. (14) decompose into two independent 2x2 linear systems:
+ Ply bn, 0, 0 (dxu \ ( ° \
&21, f»21 + Pi, 0, 0 dxn 72
0, 0, e(b 12 + P2), ebn d.X\i 7i




dxn  __ —^2^11 dxi 2   7i (̂ 22 P-2 ) e
l-̂ n | ’ |̂ 22|
d x __ 72 (bn  +  P| ) dx-2-j __  —71^22 e
de ~  I/In I ’ <*« ~  ]A „ \  '




























































































7i < 0, 72 > 0
(4ü +  p ; ) < 0 ,  i =  1,2




thus the second part of proposition 1 is proved.
For market totals we get
dXi
de





Thus, since =  P- this proves the first part.
The elasticities are given by tpjt :=  =  P j^ " p r  j  =  1,2. Computation
of these values for linear demand functions using the results derived so far, and 
taking into account the first order conditions (7), gives
p 'l *21 +  P i
3 P,
and ep2e P2 x 12 +  P2 
3 P2
Since by (7) and A2 the numerator of these expressions must be positive, from A1 
we finally conclude
- 1 /3  < ep2e < 0 < CP,e < 1/3 
which completes the proof.
Thus in this particular case we see that prices move in the standard direction. 
However it is interesting to note that the extent to which exchange rates are passed 
through is very limited if demand curves are linear. This gives an indication of 
the non-linearity in demand that would be required to move the elasticity of prices 
with respect to exchange rate changes towards one. Note also that from the proof 
it is easy to see that if the equilibrium were unstable all quantities would move in 




























































































5. Diseconomies o f  Scope
5.1. N o Strategic Interaction  (Independent Firms)
We first investigate the case in which strategic interaction can be neglected, 
that is where the i,j are arbitrarily small. Of course, every market with disec­
onomies of scope can only generate parameters A, 7 which in addition to (i) - (iv) 
satisfy (v) <212 < 0 and «34 <  0. But this is the only additional restriction im­
posed by diseconomies of scope. Thus without additional knowledge of the market 
£  =  (Cj,Pj) i , j  =  1,2 the case of no strategic interaction is indeed justified. 
One might think it is natural that diseconomies of scope come together with dis­
economies of scale and that for these markets no strategic interaction is hard to 
justify. But even for this case we can still prove that (i) - (v) are the only re­
strictions for A ,7. One only has to recognize that |Pj| j  — 1,2 solving (15.6) - 
(15.9) can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, so that |6jj| i , j  =  1,2 small does not 
conflict with c‘A > 0 i , j  =  1,2 in (15.10) - (15.13).
In proposition 2 we do not need to assume stability of the adjustment process 
since in the case of independent firms, this is implied by the concavity of the 
firms’ profit functions. More importantly, however, the removal of the strategic 
interaction consideration does, as one might expect, allow the changes in individual 
firms’ quantities to become predictable and this is seen from
P roposition  2. Given A1 - A3 with diseconomies of scope both firms increase 
sales in the market whose currency appreciates and decrease sales in the other 
market if strategic interaction can be neglected.
PROOF: By A3, |A(r*)| 0 for |6,j| i , j  =  1,2 small.
Since the solution to (14) is a continuous function of the parameters A(r.),7 (x*) 
as long as /  0, instead of taking the limit of the general solution for
\bij\ —» 0 i , j  =  1,2 we can as well solve (14) for the limit case 6; j  =  0 i , j  =  1,2. 
Then the problem decomposes into the 2 x 2  linear systems.






































































































dxn  —7i«i2 ,  „ dxn  7 i«n  _ „ dx21 72a «  e dr22 “ 72^43 e _ „
de "  |A„| <  ’ de "  |A„| ’ de ~  |A„| < ’ de ~  \An \
which completes the proof.
5.2. Strategic Com plem ents
If goods are strategic complements and production exhibits diseconomies of 
scope then the iterative adjustment process x ; ^, =  m a x{0 ,xt +  //(x (. v)} t — 
1,2,3,... never has counter effects. That is to say, if e increases, in the first step 
x 12 increases and i 2i decreases. In the second step the cost and strategic effects 
lead to a decrease in i n  and an increase in i 22 • All the following steps reinforce 
these changes. Nevertheless the process is stable if the slopes of the demand curves, 
|Pj| j  =  1,2 , are big enough. Figure 2, which has to be read with reference to 
figure 1, shows these effects.
Figure 2
In figure 2, a +  sign ( — sign) in a box or a circle means that the variable given in 
figure 1 increases (decreases). A +  sign (— sign) at an arrow from one variable to 
another means that an increase of the first leads to an increase (a decrease) of the 
second.
P roposition  3. Given A1 - AJ.H with diseconomies of scope both firms 
increase sales in the market whose currency appreciates and decrease sales in the 




























































































P r o o f :
First market:
Solving (14) for dxn  and dx21 leads to
|A| J11 =  —7 l  ( a 12 1^4.221 +  <213034042)  +  72 (0 1302 4042  — 012024043  — 0 1 3 «2 2 «4 4 )de
\A\— r—- =  —7 1  ( —011034 042 — 012 03 1 0 4 4 ) 4* 72  («1 1 0 2 2 0 4 4  ~  «1102 4  042 — «1 2  02 1 0 4 4 ) de
The signs of the expressions involved are
—7i >  0 and 72 > 0 
an < 0  i =  1, ',4
«12 — «21 ^  0 and 034 — 043 < 0 
«13 > 0,024 > O,031 > 0 and o42 > 0 
|.4„|>0 i =  l ,2
HI > 0
by A2 
by A3 or A4.2 
by diseconomies of scope 
by strategic complements 
by A3 
by A4.2
Thus we have only to consider the factors by which 72 is multiplied.
We have
«1 3  024 042 — « 1 2 0  24 043 ~  0 1 3 «2 2 «4 4
=  «13(024042 — «22044) — «12« 24 043 < 0  by A4.2
and
«1102 2044  — «1102 4  042 ~  0 1 2 «2 1 «4 4  
=  («1 1 0 2 2  — «1 2 «2 1  )«4 4  — «1102 4  042
<  —( « 11(022  +  « 24)  — 0 i 2 « 2 i ) « 4 2  b y  A 4 .2
<  —( « l i  — « 12)021042 < 0  b y  A 4 .2
Second market:
For — t =  1,2 we get analogous expressions. We only have to ex­
change —)7 and 72 , « n  and 044,022 and 033,013 and 042,012 and 043,021 and 






























































































Up to this point we have found in all the cases that we have considered that 
an exchange rate change leads to a “normal” reaction; the price in the market 
whose currency appreciates decreases and the other price increases. The reason 
for this is that so far we have analysed cases in which only one of the indirect effects 
occurred or in which they both moved in the same direction. With diseconomies 
of scope and strategic substitutes it may happen that both prices move in the 
same direction but it is impossible that the price in the market whose currency 
appreciates increases and that the other prices decreases.
P roposition  4. Given A1 - AS with diseconomies of scope it cannot happen 
that a price increase in the market whose currency appreciates occurs together with 
a price decrease in the market of the depreciated currency, if goods are strategic 
substitutes.
P r o o f :
Assume the contrary, i.e. > 0 and < 0. Nov look at the first order profit 
maximizing condition for firm 1 and 2, or equivalently split up (14) into the first 
two and the last two equations. Since in the profit function of firm i the output 
levels of firm j ( j  /  i) matter only through the aggregate output levels we must 
have that
A ( ^ \ (  \ and AJ ^ \ ( ^ - b2idx A
\dxi2 J  \71de -  ebu dX2 J  \dx22 )  \ b22dX2 )
Given A2, A3, diseconomies of scope, strategic substitutes and de > 0 , dX\ > 
0 , dX2 >  0 the “sign structures” of these equations are
Thus only \Aa\dxn <  0 and > 0  i — 1,2 are compatible with these
assumptions. But because of A3 we have |A,,| > 0  i =  1,2 which contradicts 





























































































The next proposition shows that the existence of diseconomies of scope and 
strategic substitutes does not, however, rule out both prices moving in the same 
direction. We get this “surprising” result for markets in which the direct effect 72 is 
relatively small compared to the direct effect 71 and in which firm 1 ’s indirect cost 
effects are negligible. This of course is possible only if firms are quite different. But 
as our discussion before proposition 2 showed, even with diseconomies of scope, 
we cannot rule out this sort of asymmetry. Proposition 6 will show that different 
firms are necessary to get this “surprising” result. Figure 3 shows which effects 
we have to expect.
Figure 3
Figure 3 suggests that X\i and X21 increase whereas i n  and X22 decrease. But 
since the effects involved have a hierarchical ( tree ) structure one might expect 
that the increase in X12 would outweigh the decrease in £22 and that the increase 
of £21 would outweigh the decrease in i n .
P roposition  5. Given A l - Af.2 with diseconomies of 3cope and a relatively 
small direct effect for firm i, i.e. small and a negligible cost effect for firm
j  (i 7̂  *) > an appreciation of currency i increases both prices if goods are strategic 
substitutes.
P r o o f :
Without loss of generality take i =  2, j  =  1.
A4.2 guarantees that ^  0. Since the solution to (14) is a continous function




























































































I^ l —► 0 and Icj1! —> 0 we can simply solve (14) for the limit case 72 =  0,Ci =  0. 
Because of proposition 4 it remains to show that > 0 or —̂  >  0. Solving 





=  _ 7 l “ l3 “ 34“ 42
dX
= 7 i(«n  -  ai3)a34a42 > 0
I4l^X21.4 —-— — 7iaii“ 34“ 42de
by A2, A4.2, diseconomies of scope and strategic substitutes. |
6. General Cost and Demand Functions
Until now we have imposed additional restrictions other than assumptions 
A1-A4. We have looked at diseconomies of scope, constant marginal costs and 
independent firms. If we impose no such restrictions we might expect, from lemma 
1, that prices could move in any direction as a reaction to a change in the exchange 
rate. As proposition 6 and proposition 7 will show, this is true “if and only if” 
firms are quite different. To see this, we first introduce a symmetry assumption, 
i.e. we will assume that firms’ cost functions are identical, and that the exchange 
rate is 1. We call this the case of identical firms.
P roposition  6. Given A l - Af .2 the price in the market whose currency 
appreciates decreases and the other price increases if both firms are identical. 
PROOF:
With Ci =  C2 and e =  1 the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium is symmetric with 
respect to firms. Thus we must have =  x2j, j  =  1,2. This implies —7 i ( r ’ ) =  
72(x*) =  7(1*), bifix*) =  bfix*) i =  1,2 and c^(*J,„ i J 2) =  cT,(x\,x\) 1 =
1,2, r,s  =  1,2.
In the linear system (14) we now add up the first and the third equation and the 
second and the fourth equation. This reduces (14) to
dJCi \ _  (  1
dX2)  ~  V - i
“ 13 +  “ 11 , “ 12




























































































Thus \A\^-f =  <231 +  «22 +  «12 < 0 and =  —(«31 +  +  «21) > 0.
Lastly, we must consider |A|. A inherits property A4.2 from A, thus |A| >  0, 
which completes the proof.
Figure 4
To show that, with general cost and demand functions, ‘perverse’ effects can 
occur,we therefore have to consider the case in which firms are different. To do this 
we once more concentrate on the direct and the cost effects only, ignoring strategic 
interaction. If cost functions have economies of scope we might guess from figure 
4 that as a reaction to an increase in e, firm 1 would increase sales in both markets 
whereas firm 2 would decrease sales in both markets. If the economies of scope 
are strong enough to outweigh the direct effects, then P2 will increase and P\ will 
decrease!
Proposition 7 shows that this situation is compatible with A1 - A4.1. But the 
market chosen violates A4.2, which by itself does not have any justification.
P roposition  7. With general cost and demand functions a market exists 
which satisfies A1 - A f . l  such that the price in the country whose currency appre­
ciates increases and such that the price in the other country decreases.
P r o o f :
By Lemma 1 any parameters A, 7 can be generated by a market satisfying A1 - 
A3. Now choose |6;j| i , j  =  1,2 small. Since the solution of (14) is a continuous 
function in 6,7 if |A(j..)| 0, instead of taking the limit |6;j| —> 0 of the solution





























































































\A \^ £ L -------yict12 1̂ 4-22 | > Oi =  72^44 |Aj11 <  0,
\A\^- =  7 ianI2I22I > 0, |.4|^ff =  -72 a43|A„| < 0
Now choose —yi 1̂ 4.221 =  72I2I11I =  h >  0 then \A\̂ j£- =  h(ai2 +  a44) and \A\̂ ĵ - — 
—h(a43 -f « n ) . Next choose the economies of scope <212, a43 >  0 sufficiently large 
to outweigh the direct effects a44, an < 0.
We remark that this choice is not compatible with A4.2, since then |a44| <  |a12| < 
|an| <  |a43| <  |a44| a contradiction.
However it is compatible with stability of A. It is even compatible with A 
possessing the negative dominant diagonal property, i.e. <  0 1 =  1 , 4  
and there exist weights Wj > 0 ,  j  — such that w;|ai;| > wj la>j I
i =  1 , . . .  ,4. To show this, since A is symmetric it is enough to show that A is 
negative definite. But this can always be assured by choosing a22 and 033 small 
enough, which completes the proof. |
7. An Example
As we have noted, the effects of an exchange rate change are difficult to 
calculate as a result of the presence of economies of scale or scope. This is true 
even with linear demands, which limit the complications involved in calculating 
the impact of such changes.
To examine the type of change that may occur when the exchange rate is 
modified, we calculate the equilibrium, quantities, prices and profits for a simple 
example with linear demands and additively separable quadratic costs.
Specify the demand functions in market 1 and 2 as
Pi =  n i(l -  x u  -  x 2i)
P2 =  n2( l  -  ri2 -  Z22).
The cost functions are given by




























































































Ci — ati(x2 i +  X22) — ~ - ( x 2 i +  X22)2
The parameters n,, a,, pi are allowed to vary, and we note that when /3, <  0 
there are decreasing returns to scale, and the opposite is the case for Pi >  0. 
Linearity of the demand functions and additive separability of the cost functions 
reduce the complexity of the comparative statics problem considerably (compare 
with lemma 1 for example). Given these restrictions, we could not find perverse 
movements of prices, and to get even a surprising movement of prices, we had to 
assume diseconomies of scale for one and economies of scale for the other firm.
In the examples therefore, as we would expect from the theoretical part of 
our paper, we never have a case in which the indirect effects outweigh the direct 
effect.
Figure 5 shows a situation with identical firms both of which have economies 
of scale. In this case both indirect effects move in the same direction, and therefore 
Xu increases and 122 decreases. The exchange rate determines how the market 
is shared between the firms, and increasing e means increasing and II j and 
decreasing P2 and II2.
Figure 6 shows a situation in which both firms have diseconomies of scale. For 
exchange rates smaller than 1.2, the magnitude of the diseconomies determines the 
market shares. The substitution effects dominate the cost effects thus x u  increases 
and X22 decreases. Prices and profits show normal reactions.
The most interesting situation is given in figure 7. Whereas for firm 2 the 
cost effects always dominate the substitution effects, thus X22 decreases, for firm 1 
initially the cost effects are stronger and the substitution effects dominate. Initially 
the decrease in X22 is compensated by an increase in X12 , for big enough exchange 
rates, firm 2’s movement out of both markets determines the price change. It is 
also interesting to mention that figure 7 shows a situation with linear demand 





























































































O'! =  5 =  C*2? / ? l = 3  =  /?2, 771 =  10 =  rj2
* X|j #  X12 □  X2\ A  X22
Quaniities as a function o f the exchange rate
* rii # n 2
Profist as a function o f the exchange rate
Direction o f direct and 
indirei effects






























































































0=1 =  5 =  a 2, (>\ =  -5 ,  /32 =  -1 ,  rn =  10 =  V2
* Xn #  X12 □  X21 A X22
Quantities as a function o f the exchange rate
Profits as a function o f the exchange rate
Direction o f direct and 
indirect effects
Prices as a function o f the exchange rate






























































































« i =  3/2, a 2 =  2, /?, =  -2 0 /3 , /32 =  2, rç, =  4, r,2 =  10/3
* -Xjl # -̂ 12 □ 2̂1 A ̂ 22
Quantities as a function o f the exchange rate
Profits as a function o f the exchange rate











1.00 1.23 1.46 1.69 1.92 2.15
* P, # P2 6 □  £i A E2
Prices and elasticity o f  prices with 






























































































In this paper we have examined a situation with two markets and duopolists, 
each based in one of two markets, but both selling in both markets. If the two 
markets are effectively separated and oligopolists can discriminate between mar­
kets, the effects of exchange rate changes on prices may be very complicated. The 
direction and magnitudes of these changes will depend critically on the extent 
of economies of scope and the strategic impacts of competitors’ sales on their 
margined profits.
We have given results showing that, if markets are effectively independent 
(constant marginal costs), or if firms are identical, then there is a simple monotonic 
relation between the prices in each market and the exchange rate. But with 
differing firms and general cost functions, both prices may change in the same 
direction and they may even increase in the market whose currency appreciates, 
and decrease in the market whose currency depreciates. Examples show that both 
prices may move in the same direction even if demand functions are linear and 
cost functions are additively separable.
This analysis helps to explain why the effects of exchange rate changes have 
been observed2 to be incomplete and even perverse. We have not had to rely on 
dynamics,3 inertia or sunk costs to obtain these results, they follow from simple 
comparative statics analysis. Thus, whilst the dynamics through which exchange 
rate changes are transmitted into prices are surely important, if market structure 
is taken into account they are not necessary to explain some commonly observed 
phenomena.
2 See for example Kirman and Schueller (1990) and Mcrtens (1990).
3 Froot and Klemperer (1989) show that dynamic effects may imply a price increase in the 
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